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The epistemic use of the Mandarin Chinese modal yào comes with typologically interesting 
properties. In this paper, the distribution and meaning of the epistemic use of yào will be described 
first. This use of yào is restricted to certain explicit strict comparative constructions, but forbidden 
in many other degree and non-degree constructions. Second, epistemic yào cannot appear above 
or below negation. Third, epistemic yào has a quantificational force stronger than that of existential 
modals, yet weaker than that of strong necessity modals. In the theoretical component of the paper, 
I argue that epistemic yào is a modifier for strict comparative morphemes, a syntactic/semantic 
function that sets it apart from many other epistemic modals that take propositions as direct 
argument. The weak necessity quantificational force of epistemic yào is encoded in its semantics 
by making recourse to alternative modal bases. Epistemic yào’s inability to form scopal relation 
with negation arises from two factors: (i) its status as a strict comparative morpheme modifier, and 
(ii) competition between lexical items with identical semantics. Through investigating the 
epistemic use of yào, some hitherto unnoticed interesting modal properties in natural language are 
brought to the forefront, and new intra- and inter-linguistic variations in the distribution and 




























Modals in natural language are famously associated with a wide range of “idiosyncrasies.” 
To better understand the extent to which modal elements vary, it is a meaningful and important 
enterprise to describe modal elements that demonstrate typologically “peculiar” properties, and 
then examine these properties against contemporary linguistic theory. Research along these lines 
often can reveal interesting cross-linguistic universality and variations in natural language 
modality. Along this line of research, in this paper I put under scrutiny the epistemic use of modal 
yào in Mandarin Chinese. My objectives in doing so are two-fold. First, I bring to the forefront 
some hitherto unnoticed empirical properties of modal elements existing in natural language. 
Second, I provide a theoretical analysis of these properties and locate which components of 
grammar contribute the variations observed with epistemic yào. More specifically, the epistemic 
use of yào is restricted to occur in certain strict comparative constructions. My analysis suggests 
that epistemic yào modifies a strict comparative morpheme. Thus, different from many other 
epistemic modal elements, the epistemic use of yào does not take propositions as its direct semantic 
arguments. Rather, it demonstrates an epistemic effect on the “prejacent” sentence indirectly, by 
modifying a constituent in the sentence. 
As a modal element, yào in Mandarin Chinese has several distinctive readings, some of 
which will be discussed in Section 2.3. Although the epistemic use of yào, which is intuitively 
translatable as English should and ought to in their epistemic reading, has been mentioned by 
Chinese grammarians and linguists such as Lü (1980), Li (2003), Peng (2007), and Ren (2008), 
researchers have yet to provide a detailed empirical description, let alone a convincing theoretical 
analysis, of the empirical properties observed with this particular use of yào. 
In the epistemic use, yào manifests several properties that to the best of my knowledge, 
have not been reported with any other modal element in Mandarin Chinese or in other languages. 
Two properties are worth mentioning upfront before more detailed descriptions are given in the 
next section. The first one is the distributive restriction of epistemic yào: it can only appear in 
certain explicit comparative constructions that express strict comparison (i.e., a “>” or “<” relation). 
One such construction is the relatively well studied bǐ comparative, of the form “X + bǐ + Y + 
G(radable predicate),” as illustrated in (1). The second interesting restriction of epistemic yào is 
that it is not acceptable to co-occur with negation, as in (2), no matter whether it appears above or 
below negation on the surface form.1 
 
(1) Dàiyù yào bǐ Bǎochāi piàoiàng. 
Daiyu YAO BI Baochai beautiful 
‘Daiyu should be more beautiful than Baochai.’ 
(2) Dàiyù (*bù) yào (*bù) bǐ Bǎochāi ǎi yìxiē  
Daiyu NEG YAO NEG BI Baochai short a bit 
Intended: ‘It should not be the case that Daiyu is a little shorter than Baochai.’ 
 
The rest of the paper is devoted to describing and explaining the empirical properties of 
epistemic yào. In Section 2, I will focus on describing the empirical properties of epistemic yào, 
with particular reference to its rather restrictive distribution, weak necessity quantificational force, 
and lack of scopal interaction with negation. In Section 3, I will show that the observed 
“peculiarities” with epistemic yào actually follow from its unique syntactic behaviors and the 
                                                            
1 Abbreviations used in this paper are as follows: ASP = aspectual marker, CL = classifier, COP = copular, DIST = 
distributive marker, EXT = extent marker, INT = interjection, MOD = modifier marker, NEG = negative marker. 
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accompanying semantics. In Section 4, by way of concluding the paper, I will briefly discuss some 
theoretical implications of my analysis of epistemic yào and point out several remaining open 
issues. 
 
2. Empirical properties of epistemic yào 
In this section, I will first show that the epistemic use of yào is restricted to comparative 
constructions that explicitly express strict comparison. This restriction makes epistemic yào a 
cross-linguistically rare modal phenomenon. Then, I will discuss two other interesting properties 
of epistemic yào: its weak necessity quantificational force and lack of scopal interaction with 
negation. For the sake of completeness, toward the end of this section I will also mention some 
non-epistemic uses of yào. 
 
2.1 The basic distribution of epistemic yào 
An important empirical generalization regarding the distribution of epistemic yào is that it 
only occurs in degree constructions that explicitly encode a strict comparative relation. Strict 
comparison is defined as involving either a “greater-than” (i.e., “>”) or a “less-than” (“<”) relation. 
“Greater-than-or-equal-to” (“≥”), “less-than-or-equal-to” (“≤”), and strict identity (“=”) relations 
are not strict comparison.  
First, epistemic yào cannot appear in non-comparative constructions. The sentence in (3) 
does not express a comparative relation. It is acceptable only under the deontic reading of yào, 
about Baoyu’s obligation of staying at home tomorrow morning. It is unacceptable under the 
epistemic reading of yào, whereby the speaker makes a judgment, or reveals her belief/knowledge, 
regarding the possibility of Baoyu staying at home tomorrow morning.2 The sentence in (4), which 
involves the progressive marker (zhèng) zài under yào, is ungrammatical, and thus does not have 
any reading, not to mention an epistemic one.  
 
(3) *Bǎoyù míngtiān zǎoshàng yào zài jiā. 
  Baoyu tomorrow morning YAO at  home 
  Intended: ‘It should be the case that Baoyu will be at home tomorrow morning.’ 
(4) *wǒmen xiàozhǎng yào      zhèng  zài      jiēdài  kèrén. 
  our principal YAO  right now ASP     meet  guest 
 Intended: ‘Our principal should be meeting with the guests right now.’ 
 
It is worth pointing out that I am taking a narrow definition of comparative construction. 
Although equative constructions show certain semantic similarities to comparative constructions, 
they are not considered comparative constructions in this paper. They behave just like other non-
comparative constructions in not being able to “license” the epistemic use of yào. The observation 
is manifest from the ungrammatical sentences in (5-6), both of which involve hé/gēn/xiàng x 
yíyàng G roughly translatable as “(exactly) as G as x” (Eckardt 2009). The ungrammaticality of 
the two sentences is attributable to the presence of epistemically intended yào, for they would 
become grammatical if yào was removed, or received a deontic interpretation.  
 
                                                            
2  Most (but not all, cf., the sentence in (4)) of the ungrammatical/marginal yào sentences in this paper receives such 
a judgment only when yào is intended for the epistemic reading. They may be acceptable under non-epistemic readings 
of yào. In this paper, unless otherwise noted, I am only concerned with the grammaticality status of yào sentences 
under the epistemic reading.  
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(5) * Dàiyù yào gēn Bǎochāi  yíyàng  cōngmíng. 
   Daiyu YAO with Baochai the same smart 
   Intended: ‘Daiyu should be (exactly) as smart as Baochai.’ 
   (Without yào): ‘Daiyu is (exactly) as smart as Baochai.’ 
(6) *Běijīng de        fángjià yào    gēn      Shànghǎi yīyàng    gāo/guì.           
  Beijing MOD   house price    should     with    Shanghai same       high/expensive 
Intended: ‘The house price in Beijing should be (exactly) as expensive as in Shanghai.’ 
      (Without yào): ‘The house price in Beijing is (exactly) as expensive as in Shanghai. 
 
At first blush, my claim seems too strong that epistemic yào cannot be “licensed” in non-
comparative constructions, especially in face of the observation that yào can appear in a non-
comparative sentence with a dynamic predicate and a future-oriented interpretation, as illustrated 
in the following two sentences:  
 
(7) lǎo  tàitai  yào fāhuǒ   le. 
old  madam YAO become angry  ASP 
‘The old grandmother will become angry.’ 
(8) nà    ge mǎxìtuán xià ge xīngqī  yào lái běijīng      yǎnchū. 
that   CL circus  next CL week  YAO come Beijing     show 
‘The circus will come to play in Beijing next week.’ 
 
Most crucially, yào in such non-comparative sentences is not used as an epistemic modal, contrary 
to what descriptive linguists such as Peng (2007), Zhang (2007), and Guo and Yi (2008) assumed.3 
As a piece of empirical evidence, true epistemic modals – like the epistemic use of English must 
and Chinese yīnggāi ‘should’ – are disallowed in the complement of factive predicates (Papafragou 
1998, Lyons 1977). For instance, the whole sentence in (9) is unacceptable (or very marginal for 
some Mandarin Chinese native speakers) under the epistemic reading of yīnggāi, in spite of the 
fact that the clause embedded under the factive predicate ràngrénjīngyà de shì ‘what is surprising 
is’ is acceptable under the same reading for yīnggāi. Non-comparative sentences containing yào 
that are (mistakenly) taken by some descriptive linguists to involve epistemic modality indeed can 
occur in the complement of factive predicates (10a), thus standing in stark contrast to the behavior 
of epistemic yào in comparative sentences (10b). 4  This contrast suggests that yào in non-
comparative sentences does not receive a (true) epistemic interpretation. 
 
                                                            
3 It is a cross-linguistically robust observation that certain modals ambiguous between epistemic and other modal 
readings cannot receive an epistemic interpretation when they appear in a dynamic sentence. For example, such modals 
as must and cannot in English are allowed to receive an epistemic reading only when it occurs in a stative sentence, 
as in (i). Ramchand (2014) attributed the restriction to how (i.e., whether indexically or anaphorically) an epistemic 
modal anchors the denotation of the prejacent in terms of time and possible world. Whether Ramchand’s analysis, 
which is based on English modals like must, can be extended to epistemic yào remains an open question that I will 
leave to future research. Minimally, her analysis needs to be changed to accommodate my analysis (anticipating details 
to be provided later in the paper) of epistemic yào as a modifier for strict comparative morphemes, rather than taking 
prejacent propositions as its direct argument. 
 
(i) a. John must be in his office.       (√epistemic,  √deontic) 
        b. John must go to his office.        (*epistemic,  √deontic) 
 
4 The embedded clause in (10a) is adapted from Zhang (2007: p.68). 
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(9) */??ràngrénjīngyà     de      shì     tā xiànzài     yīnggāi zài shuìjiào. 
       surprising     MOD   COP   he now      should ASP sleep 
Intended: */?? ‘It is surprising that he should be sleeping now.’ 
(10) a. ràngrénjīngyà de shì běijīng  jīnwǎn  yào dìzhèn    
    surprising   MOD COP Beijing tonight  YAO earthquake 
   ‘It is surprising that there will be an earthquake in Beijing tonight.’   
b. */??ràngrénjīngyà     de  shì mèimei        yào   bǐ gēge  gāo. 
        surprising          MOD COP younger sister   YAO    BI elder brother tall 
Intended: */?? ‘It is surprising that the younger sister should be taller than the elder brother.’ 
 
  Moreover, if yào that appears in a non-comparative sentence with a dynamic verb and a 
future-oriented interpretation is a (true) epistemic modal, one would expect that it cannot be used 
to make a judgment in such contexts that involve no subjective uncertainty whatsoever on the part 
of the speaker. However, this prediction does not hold. The sentence in (11), for instance, can be 
uttered by a most authoritative and confident NASA expert who, based on highly sophisticated 
and precise calculations as well as the transpired trajectory of the rocket, knows without the least 
doubt regarding whether, how, and when the rocket will land on Mars. 
 
(11) huǒjiàn yī fēnzhōng hòu yào jiàngluò dào huǒxīng    jīdì    le 
rocket one minute  after YAO descend arrive Mars      base  ASP 
      ‘The rocket will descend on the base on Mars in one minute.’ 
 
Nevertheless, yào in such non-comparative sentences as in (7-8) has been often perceived 
and claimed to have an epistemic flavor which indicates subjective uncertainty on the part of the 
speaker. I postulate that the epistemic uncertainty in fact arises from the future-oriented 
interpretation of yào in such sentences. Generally speaking, future events are unsettled 
metaphysical possibilities with respect to a reference time (usually the speaker’s utterance time). 
Metaphysical uncertainty, in turn, can lead to epistemic uncertainty (Condoravdi 2002). It is this 
resulting, secondary epistemic uncertainty, I think, that makes yào in non-comparative sentences 
with dynamic verbs appear to be an epistemic modal. 
The next observation is that epistemic yào is only allowed to appear in explicit comparative 
constructions, but not in implicit comparative constructions. Explicit comparison establishes 
ordering between two objects x and y with respect to a gradable property g through employing 
conventional, specialized degree morphology (whether overt or covert) which specifies x’s degree 
of being g to exceed y’s degree of being g. By contrast, implicit comparison establishes ordering 
between x and y with respect to g by “taking advantage of the inherent context sensitivity of the 
positive (unmarked) form” (Kennedy 2007). The bǐ comparative is a commonplace instance of 
explicit comparison in Mandarin Chinese. It has been analyzed by many scholars such as Erlewine 
(2007), J. Lin (2009), and Liu (2011). The bǐ sentence in (1) has demonstrated its compatibility 
with epistemic yào. The sentence in (12) is yet another example of the bǐ comparative, which can 
be used to express, with a high degree of subjective certainty, the speaker’s belief that the (average) 
house price in Beijing is more expensive than in Shanghai. The guò comparative morpheme in ‘X 
G guò Y (D)’ – where G is a gradable adjective and D an optional differential phrase – is another 
strategy of marking explicit comparison in Mandarin Chinese (Liu 2007). Yào appearing in this 
comparative construction can also receive an epistemic reading, as illustrated in (13). More explicit 
comparative constructions will be discussed shortly. 
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(12) Běijīng de fáng jià yào   bǐ Shànghǎi gāo/guì. 
Beijing    MOD house price    YAO   BI Shanghai high/expensive 
‘The house price in Beijing should be more expensive than in Shanghai.’ 
(13) (wǒ  gǎnjué)  nánfāngrén de chuàngyèrèqíng  yào gāo   guò běifāngrén 
  I    feel      southerner MOD entrepreneurship sprit  YAO high  exceed northerner 
‘(I feel) that southerners have a higher level of entrepreneurship spirit than do northerners.'  
 
There are several different ways to express implicit comparison in Mandarin Chinese, but 
crucially, none of them is compatible with the epistemic reading of yào. Contrastive focus 
sentences, for instance, can specify two entities under contrast such that one entity is associated 
with a quality (e.g., being tall) absent in, different from, or opposite to (that of) the other entity 
(Liu 2010). Such sentences express comparison implicitly, and do not allow yào that appears in 
them to have an epistemic reading (14). 
 
(14) * Běijīng yào lěng，xiānggǎng yào rè. 
   Beijing YAO cold,   Hong Kong YAO hot 
  Intended: “It should be the case that Beijing is cold, and Hong Kong is hot.’ 
 
Another strategy of making implicit comparison in Mandarin Chinese is to use the gēn x bǐ 
qǐlai “compared with x” construction. When the construction does not occur with any other 
comparative morpheme, it is generally taken to express implicit comparison (Liu 2014, Erlewine 
2007).5 When the construction expresses implicit comparison, it does not allow epistemic yào to 
appear in it. By contrast, other epistemic elements can (at least marginally) appear in implicit 
comparative constructions, as illustrated by the sentence in (15).6   
 
(15)  gēn    bālǐdǎo bǐqǐlái,      xiàwēiyí *yào/yīding/?yīnggāi/?kěnéng   hěn  guì.  7 
with    Bali island  compare   Hawaii YAO/certainly/should/possibly  very   expensive  
      ‘Compared with Bali, Hawaii *YAO is/definitely is/possibly is/should be very expensive.’ 
       (Without yào): ‘Compared with Bali island, Hawaii is very expensive.’ 
 
Thirdly, not all explicit comparative constructions allow the epistemic use of yào. 
Epistemic yào can only occur in comparative sentences that explicitly express a strict comparative 
relation; it is not attested in comparative sentences that express “≥” or “≤” relations, viz., 
comparative relations including an equative component. The sentences in (1), (12) and (13) have 
indicated the compatibility of epistemic yào with two Mandarin Chinese explicit comparative 
                                                            
5Erlewine (2007) and J. Lin (2007) are among the first researchers to observe that in Mandarin Chinese gēn x bǐ qǐlai 
“compared with x” construction can express implicit comparison. In his recent work, Liu (2014) further noted that the 
construction can be “divided into two subtypes,” depending on whether other explicit comparative morpheme occurs 
within it. Thus, Liu (2014) also appeared to suggest that gēn x bǐ qǐlai – when used on its own – is a strategy of making 
implicit comparison. 
6 A native speaker of Mandarin Chinese suggested to me that adding the verb suan ‘count, consider’ and the sentence-
final particle le to gēn x bǐ qǐlai implicit comparative sentences would improve the acceptability of yào in such 
sentences. All other native speakers of Mandarin Chinese I consulted, however, did not share the judgment. In addition, 
Mandarin Chinese native speakers’ judgment about other epistemic elements appearing in implicit comparative 
constructions shows inter-speaker variation. In this paper, I will leave aside issues that may lie behind the above inter-
speaker variations of judgment. 
7 This sentence is adapted from http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/66487595.html，retrieved on October 18, 2015.  
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constructions -- the bǐ and guò comparatives. At least three other explicit strict comparative 
constructions in Mandarin Chinese have been discussed in the literature, and they are all 
compatible with epistemic yào. 8 The so-called transitive comparative, in which the standard-of-
comparison phrase appears right after the gradable predicate, allows epistemic yào to appear in it 
(16-17). Similarly for the closely-related chū comparative construction, which differs from the 
transitive comparative just in that an overt degree morpheme chū ‘exit, exceed’ intervenes between 
the standard-of-comparison phrase and the gradable predicate (also, (16-17)).  
 
(16) Wángjùn yào  gāo (chū)   Zhèngzhāng zhěngzhěng yī ge tóu. 
Wangjun should  tall exceed   Zhengzhang whole  one CL head 
‘Wangjun should be a whole head taller than Zhengzhang.’ 
(17) ?shìqū de lājī liàng    yào    duō  (chū)      jiāoqū liǎngbèi. 
city MOD trash amount   YAO     many/much  exceed    suburban twice 
‘The amount of trash in the city should be twice more than that in the suburban area.’ 
 
Still another explicit strict comparative construction, the gèng comparative construction, 
also allows the occurrence of epistemic yào, as illustrated in (18). Interestingly, the gèng 
comparative can be embedded in the bǐ comparative. When such embedding occurs, epistemic yào 
can appear before either, and even both, of bǐ and gèng. The sentence in (19) are grammatical with 
one yào before bǐ/ gèng or with two yào’s. 
 
(18) tāde méiguī,    huā        hóng,    yèzi yào    gèng     lǜ. 
his  rose     flower    red        leaf  should    GENG green 
‘His rose, its flowers are red; its leaves should be even greener (than its flowers are red). 
(19) mántóu (yào) bǐ mǐfàn (yào)  gèng    yǒuyì yu shòushēn.9 
mun YAO BI rice YAO GENG    benefit to lose weight 
‘Eating muns should be more beneficial for losing weight.’ 
 
Like in many other languages, an explicit comparative sentence in Mandarin Chinese does 
not have to have a standard-of-comparison phrase overtly specified in the sentence. Rather, the 
standard can be supplied from the extra-linguistic context. Such explicit comparative sentences, if 
they express strict comparison, are still compatible with epistemic yào. This claim is illustrated by 
the sentence in (20) (taken from Lü 1980: p.593), in which the clarity of the photo in the back is 
implicated to serve as the standard of comparison for clarity of the photo in the front.10 
 
(20) zhè      liǎng     zhāng     zhàopiàn,  qián   yī zhāng yào  qīngchu      xiē. 
this     two       CL          photo   front   one CL should    clear        a bit 
‘Between these two photos, the front one should be a bit clearer.’ 
 
                                                            
8 Important relevant works include Xiang (2005), Erlewine (2007), Liu (2007), and Grano and Kennedy (2012) on the 
transitive and chū comparative constructions, and Liu (2010, 2014) on the gèng comparative construction.  
9  This example was retrieved and adapted from http://wx.shenchuang.com/article/2015-09-05/1176405.html 
(accessed on Nov. 14, 2015) 
10 The degree modifier xiē ‘a bit’ only can be used with the comparative reading of certain adjectives, but not with the 
positive reading. Thus, qīngchu ‘clear’ in (20) only have a comparative reading, giving rise to an explicit comparative 
sentence. .Deleting xiē would make qīngchu receive a positive reading and (20) an implicit comparative sentence. 
Then, yào would be unacceptable in the resulting sentence. 
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In contrast to explicit strict comparatives, an explicit comparative construction which 
specifies a “≥” or “≤” relation cannot license the epistemic use of yào. In Mandarin Chinese, the 
comparative construction “X + yǒu + Y + G,” where X and Y are determiner phrases and G a 
gradable predicate or a dimension noun, specifies a “≥” relation between the referents of X and Y 
with respect to the property specified by G (Xie 2011, 2014). Despite its surface similarity with 
the bǐ comparative (of the form “X + bǐ + Y + G”), the yǒu comparative construction does not 
express a strict comparative relation.11 Consequently, it does not allow epistemic yào to occur in 
it, no matter whether G is a gradable predicate or a dimension noun (21-22).   
 
(21) *Zhāngsān   de    chéngjì yào yǒu tā gēge   hǎo.  
 Zhangsan   MOD    grade YAO have his elder brother good 
 Intended: ‘Zhangsan’s grades should be as good as his elder brother’s’ 
(22) *nà ge lízi yào   yǒu    quántou yībān   dàxiǎo. 
 that CL pear YAO   have     fist     like   size 
Intended: ‘The pear should be as big as a fist.’ 
 
To summarize, in this sub-section it has been shown that yào is allowed to have an 
epistemic reading when it occurs in explicit strict comparative constructions. Non-comparative 
constructions, implicit comparative construction, and (explicit) comparative constructions that do 
not express a strict comparative relation can’t “license” the epistemic use of yào. No modal with 
such a restricted distribution has been reported in the literature. Thus, epistemic yào constitutes a 
cross-linguistic rarity of modal element that has the potential to reveal important variations in 
natural language modality. 
 
2.2 Some further properties of epistemic yào 
In addition to the distribution pattern discussed above, epistemic yào shows interesting 
properties with regard to: (i) lack of scopal relation with negation, and (ii) weak necessity 
quantificational force. First, it is a robust cross-linguistic generalization that epistemic modals can 
scope over negation (Cinque 1999, Hacquard 2006). This generalization presupposes that 
epistemic modals can scopally interact with negation. Epistemic yào, however, constitutes an 
interesting exception to the generalization, in that it cannot interact with negation in any way (Peng 
2007, Ni 2008). For instance, if without the negation marker bù, (23) would be grammatical. 
Adding bù – whether before or after yào, would make the resulting sentence ungrammatical. 12 
                                                            
11 The yǒu comparative in Mandarin Chinese was taken by Xie (2014) to be translational equivalent of the “as…as” 
construction in English, which specifies a “≥” relation (e.g., see Schwarzschild 2008 for a recent review).  
12 There is an idiomatic expression yàobu (with the tone on bù being neutralized) in Mandarin Chinese, which means 
“either … or” when yàobu is used in pairs or “otherwise” when it is used alone.  It cannot be decomposed into an 
epistemic yào followed by the negative marker bù. Thus, even when used in a strict comparative sentence (e.g., (i)), 
yàobu should not be confused with our discussion of scopal relation between epistemic yào and negation. 
 
(i) rìběn   huò        yàobu   bǐ    hánguó   huò         guì,            yàobu   bǐ     měiguó      huò         guì  
     Japan  product  either    BI   Korean   product  expensive   or         BI    American   product   expensive 




The same holds for another negative marker méi, which is typically used to negate completed 
actions (24) (Li and Thompson 1981).13 
 
(23) hěnduō   diànzǐ   chǎnpǐn    zhōngguó   (*bù)    yào        (*bù)   bǐ    měiguó     guì. 
many      electronic  product    China    NEG   should   NEG    BI   USA         expensive 
Intended: ‘It should not be the case that many electronic products are more expensive in 
China than in USA.’ 
(24) yóu  jià qùnián      (*méi)     yào   (*méi)   bǐ   qiánnián       gāo chū   33% 
oil   price last year       NEG   YAO  NEG    BI   the year before last high exceed   33% 
Intended: ‘It should not be the case that gas price was 33% higher last year than the year 
before.’   
 
Next, there exists empirical evidence to suggest that epistemic yào is a weak necessity 
modal comparable to should and ought to in English. First, epistemic yào is not a pure existential 
modal that expresses the mere existence of certain relevant possibilities. In the conversation given 
in (25), for example, the first clause in Speaker B’s responses indicates that B agrees with Speaker 
A’s judgment about the reliability of diaries as opposed to memoirs. The second clause in Speaker 
B’s response is intended to further elaborate on how the speaker agrees. By using the pure 
existential modal element kěnéng ‘possible’, however, the second clause in Speaker B’s response 
weakens, and as a result contradicts with, the expressed agreement in the first clause.14 The 
weakening/contradiction is comparable to what is responsible for the infelicity observed with (26), 
which involves canonical nominal quantification phrases. Hence, epistemic yào has a stronger 
quantificational force than the canonical pure existential modal kěnéng ‘possible’. 
 
(25) A: wǒ juéde rìjì yào    bǐ huíyìlù  kěkào. 
I  feel diary YAO    BI memoir reliable 
‘I think diaries should be more reliable than memoirs.’ 
       B. #wǒ   yě     zhème  juéde,   rìjì      quèshí     kěnéng     bǐ    huíyìlù kěkào. 
    I     also   so        think     diary   indeed    possible    BI   memoir reliable 
              ‘I think so, too. It is indeed possible that diaries are more reliable than memoirs.’ 
(26) A:  jué  dàduōshù  rén  dōu lái le. 
outright majority people  DIST come ASP 
‘The by far majority of people have come.’ 
      B:  #duì   a, yǒude    rén     lái    le. 
 right  INT some   people   come  ASP 
 ‘Right, some people have come.’ 
 
                                                            
13  Yào has a bouletic use that expresses the speaker’s desire and that may be confused with the epistemic use. The 
bouletic use of yào is compatible with negative contexts, as illustrated in (i) below. Still another important distinction 
between the bouletic and epistemic uses of yào is that only the former use can be embedded under desire predicates 
like xīwàng ‘hope’: 
 
(i) (wǒ  xīwàng) nánpéngyǒu bú yào bǐ wǒ ǎi. 
I  hope boyfriend NEG YAO BI I short 
‘(I hope that) my boyfriend should not be shorter than me.’  
 
14  In this paper, the “*” symbol is used to indicate ungrammaticality, and “#” to indicate pragmatic infelicity. 
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At the same time, the quantificational force of epistemic yào is weaker than that of strong 
necessity modals like yídìng ‘definitely’ and kěndìng ‘certainly.’ This claim is evident from the 
fact that an epistemic modal statement expressed by yào can be ensued by a strong necessity 
epistemic statement, while reversing the order of the two statements would lead to pragmatic 
infelicity (27). Again, the empirical pattern is comparable to a statement involving a weaker 
nominal quantifier followed by another statement involving a stronger nominal quantifier, such as 
in (28). This parallelism suggests that epistemic yào cannot be a strong necessity modal, either.  
 
(27) a. tā    yào        bǐ  línjū       yǒuqián, shìshíshàng tā   kěndìng    bǐ  línjū       yǒuqián. 
    he   should  BI neighbor    rich         in fact      he  certainly  BI   neighbor  rich 
‘He should be richer than his neighbors, in fact, he is certainly richer than his neighbors.’ 
b. #tā    kěndìng   bǐ   línjū    yǒuqián,  shìshíshàng tā   yào   bǐ  línjū       yǒuqián. 
(28) a. He finished most of the tasks, in fact, he finished all of them. 
b. #He finished all of the tasks, in fact, he finished most of them. 
 
The above empirical pattern of epistemic yào, with respect to quantificational force, is 
strongly reminiscent of should and ought to in English, both of which have been shown by Copley 
(2006) and von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) to be weak necessity modals. In this paper I follow their 
suit to conclude that epistemic yào in Mandarin Chinese are weak necessity modals, as well. 
To sum up, in this sub-section I described two more important properties of epistemic yào: 
its weak necessity quantificational force and inability to co-occur with negation. Although the 
former property is familiar from Copley’s (2006) and von Fintel and Iatridou’s (2008) research on 
English should and ought to, the latter property constitutes an interesting exception to the widely 
observed propensity of epistemic modals to form scopal relation with negation. 
 
2.3 Non-epistemic uses of yào 
Before I conclude this section, I would like to briefly mention some other uses of yào, by 
drawing on recent advances of classifying modality (e.g., Portner 2009) and descriptive Chinese 
linguistic research (e.g., Lü 1980 and Peng 2007). The discussion is by no means intended to offer 
an exhaustive list of interpretations for yào, as doing so would require much more space than 
available in this paper. First, yào can be used as a “regular” transitive verb taking a nominal 
argument and meaning ‘want’, ‘request’ and ‘require’ depending on the context of use (29). 
  
(29) a.  wǒ  yào yī gēn xiāngjiāo.               (want reading) 
I  want one CL banana 
‘I want a banana.’ 
      b.  tā     zuótiān  xiàng      bàba     yào       le    wǔ kuài qián.         (request reading) 
 he    yesterday   toward   father  request   ASP  five dollar money 
 ‘He requested five dollars yesterday from his dad.’ 
c. bān zhè zhāng zhuōzi    yào  sì ge rén.         (require reading) 
          move this CL table    require four CL people. 
          ‘It requires four people to move this table.’  
 
Second, when used as a modal element, yào have at least the following non-epistemic 
readings: a deontic reading to express requirements and obligations (30), as a “volitional” modal 
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to express a future action available to an agent (31), as a teleological modal to express means of 
achieving a goal (31), as well as a bouletic modal to express desires ((33), repeated from fn. 13). 
The deontic and volitional readings of yào have been relatively well-studied from many different 
perspectives by such scholars as Chao (1968), Tsang (1981), Li (2003), Peng (2007), Ren (2008), 
Ni (2008), Wu and Kuo (2010), and T. Lin (2012). The teleological and bouletic uses, however, 
have received as little attention as the epistemic use. Out of practical reasons, I will leave these 
uses for future research.   
 
(30) měi     ge  fùmǔ  dōu  yào     bāng    háizi    fāzhǎn qíngshāng           (deontic) 
every  CL parent DIST should    help    child    develop emotional quotient 
‘Every parent should help their children to develop emotional maturity.’ 
(31) wǒ  jīntiān  xiàwǔ  yào qù yóuyǒng.        (volitional) 
I  today  afternoon will go swim 
‘I will go swimming this afternoon.’ 
(32) xiǎng jiǎnféi  jiù yào shǎo chī duō dòng.    (teleological) 
want lose weight then YAO little eat much exercise 
“In order to lose weight, one should eat little/less and exercise much/more.’  
(33) (wǒ xīwàng) nánpéngyǒu bú yào bǐ wǒ ǎi.         (bouletic) 
   I  hope  boyfriend NEG YAO BI I short 
‘(I hope that) my boyfriend should not be shorter than me.’  
 
To summarize, in this section I described several key empirical properties of epistemic yào. 
Two restrictions set yào apart from many familiar modal elements. The first is the restrictive 
distribution that epistemic yào can only appear in explicit strict comparative constructions, and the 
second is its inability to form any scopal relation with negation. Still another interesting fact is that 
epistemic yào manifests weak necessity quantificational force, a property that makes it comparable 
to should and ought to in English. The next task that I would like to take up in this paper is to 
provide a theoretical analysis of the three empirical properties of epistemic yào. In particular, I 
will address the question of which properties come from which components of grammar (e.g., 
syntax, semantics, their interface) for epistemic yào.  
 
3. Explaining the empirical properties of epistemic yào 
In this section, I will provide a theoretical analysis of the following three properties of 
epistemic yào, in that order: (i) the epistemic reading of yào is allowed only when it occurs in 
explicit strict comparative sentences, (ii) epistemic yào is a weak universal modal, and (iii) 
epistemic yào cannot form any scopal relation with negation.  
 
3.1 epistemic yào “licensed” only in explicit strict comparative sentences 
The highly restrictive distribution of epistemic yào makes it distinguished not only from non-
epistemic uses of yào, but also from many familiar modals in languages such as Mandarin Chinese 
and English. Explaining its distribution restriction has the potential to reveal interesting parameters 
of variation in the syntax and semantics of natural language modality. The primary point of 
departure for my analysis of the restrictive distribution of epistemic yào is the rather under-
appreciated observation of epistemic yào showing considerable flexibility regarding where it can 
appear in explicit strict comparative constructions, especially in the bǐ comparative. Lü (1980) 
noted that when yào takes an epistemic reading in a bǐ comparative sentence, it can appear right 
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before bǐ, right after the standard-of-comparison phrase, or even right after the extent marker de – 
provided the extent marker is present, of course. Where it appears does not (significantly) affect 
the acceptability or meaning of the sentence15. The sentence in (34), taken from Lü (1980: p.593), 
allows yào to have an epistemic reading in any one of the three indicated positions. 
 
(34) tā (yào) bǐ wǒ (yào) zǒu de (yào) kuài xiē. 
he  YAO BI me YAO walk EXT YAO fast a bit 
‘It should be the case that he walks faster than I do.’ 
 
 Given the multiple possible positions for epistemic yào in a bǐ comparative sentence, a 
natural question to ask is whether it can occur simultaneously in more than one position. Generally 
speaking, such co-occurrence sounds rather degraded. However, I think the unnaturalness arises 
from the general dis-preference of stylistic redundancy, rather than from any deep grammatical 
constraint. When circumstances permit or call for such repetition, it actually can be used as a useful 
emphasis strategy. Indeed, epistemic yào is not categorically banned from occurring multiple times 
in the same bǐ comparative sentence. The bǐ sentences in (35) and (36), both containing two 
instances of epistemic yào, are adapted from the Internet and judged “somewhat acceptable” or 
“fully acceptable” by all three native speakers of Mandarin Chinese who I consulted. The sentence 
in (19) (repeated in (37a), with minimum stylistic modifications) illustrates multiple occurrences 
of epistemic yào in a sentence combining the bǐ comparative with the gèng comparative. In 
addition, the second epistemic yào can occur right before yǒuyì ‘benefit’ (37b). 16 
 
(35) (?) dōngzhī    de     chuántǒng jiādiàn      yèwù       yào      bǐ     rìlì         yào      quán.17 
      Toshiba   MOD   traditional appliance  business  YAO   BI    Hitachi  YAO  whole 
  ‘Toshiba should have more comprehensive traditional appliance business than Hitachi.’ 
(36) (?)Jiāngwǔ  yào   bǐ tā     zhǎng de yào kěài       yīxiē. 18 
    Jiangwu   YAO   BI he    grow EXT YAO loveable     a bit 
  ‘Jiangwu should be more loveable in appearance than him.’ 
(37) a. (?) mántóu yào bǐ mǐfàn yào  gèng    yǒuyì yu shòushēn. 
    mun  YAO BI rice YAO GENG    benefit to lose weight 
‘Eating muns should be more beneficial for losing weight.’ 
b. (?) mántóu yào bǐ mǐfàn gèng  yào   yǒuyì   yu shòushēn. 
    mun  YAO BI rice GENG  YAO  benefit    to lose weight 
 
                                                            
15 To the best of my knowledge, among the rather limited descriptive literature on epistemic yào, Lǚ (1980) is the only 
work where this observation of positional flexibility is made.  
16 To give a fair and complete picture, I did not find naturally-occurring sentences that contain three theoretically 
possible slots for epistemic yào and that in reality involve epistemic yào in the second slot occurring together with 
another slot (i.e., the first and/or third slots). According to judgments by the three Mandarin Chinese native speakers 
that I consulted, sentences containing epistemic yào in the second slot and an additional slot strongly oriented toward 
the “unacceptable” end. Three instances of epistemic yào occurring together was constantly judged by these native 
speakers to be “unacceptable.” Unfortunately, at this point I do not know why this is the case, and will have to leave 
the question open for future research.    
17 This example was retrieved and adapted from http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-08/13/c_128123437_2.htm 
(accessed on Nov. 12, 2015) 
18 This sentence was retrieved and adapted from http://tieba.baidu.com/p/7424295 (accessed on Nov. 12, 2015). 
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The positional flexibility of epistemic yào in bǐ and gèng comparative constructions, 
combined with the possibility of simultaneous multiple occurrences of epistemic yào, renders it to 
stand in stark contrast to other (epistemic) modals in Mandarin Chinese. Take the epistemic use of 
yīnggāi ‘should’ and kěndìng ‘must’ for example. They can occur immediately before bǐ, but are 
not acceptable in any other position: replacing the first possible occurrence of yào with yīnggāi in 
(34) would yield a grammatical sentence with roughly the same interpretation, but making the 
same replacement in the second possible position of yào would yield an unacceptable (or marginal 
for some native speakers) sentence, and replacement in the third position would yield an outright 
unacceptable sentence (38). Replacing yào with propositional modifiers like xiǎnrán ‘obviously’ 
and wúyí ‘certainly, with no doubt’ would yield exactly the same grammaticality pattern, as 
illustrated in (39). In addition, these modal elements and propositional modifiers can never occur 
multiple times in a bǐ or gèng comparative sentence, an observation that further sets them apart 
from epistemic yào.  
 
(38) tā (yīnggāi) bǐ wǒ (??/*yīnggāi) zǒu de (*yīnggāi) kuài xiē. 
he   should        BI me should       walk EXT should      fast a bit 
‘It should/must be the case that he walks faster than I do.’ 
(39) tā (xiǎnrán) bǐ wǒ (??/*xiǎnrán) zǒu de (*xiǎnrán) kuài xiē. 
he   obviously BI me obviously walk EXT obviously fast a bit 
‘It is obviously the case that he walks faster than I do.’ 
 
My analysis of the distributive restriction of epistemic yào precisely capitalizes on the 
above distinction. In the epistemic use, yīnggāi and kěndìng behave on a par with xiǎnrán and wúyí 
in taking a proposition as their argument (Cinque 1999, Tsai 2001, Hacquard 2006, among 
others)19. This property explains why these elements are categorically barred from occurring in an 
extent de-phrase in a bǐ comparative sentence. Specifically, an extent de-phrase forms an island, 
as is evident from the unacceptability of zěnme ‘how (manner)’) in (40). Thus, it does not allow 
any element in it to undergo LF movement (Huang 1982), including those elements that have to 
raise to take the whole proposition expressed by the sentence as its argument. The fact that 
epistemic yào is allowed to appear in a de extent phrase suggests that it does not take a proposition 
as its argument.20  
 
(40) *nèixie háizi zuótiān kū de lǎoshī    dōu  zěnme   chéngfá tāmen? 
 those child yesterday cry EXT teacher    DIST  how    punish them 
Intended: ‘What was the manner x such that the children cried yesterday to the extent that the 
teacher published them in x?’ 
 
 I propose instead that in its epistemic use, yào modifies a strict comparative morpheme. 
Furthermore, I postulate that as a modifier, epistemic yào obligatorily selects for a strict 
comparative morpheme, and cannot combine with any other degree or non-degree morpheme. Its 
                                                            
19 A difference between yīnggāi and kěndìng on the one hand and xiǎnrán and wúyí on the other is that the latter 
proposition modifiers can appear sentence initially. This difference has to do with the different lexical categories they 
belong to. While yīnggāi and kěndìng are modal verbs, xiǎnrán and wúyí are adverbs. Nothing in my analysis hinges 
on this difference, however. 
20 At this stage, it remains an open question why such phrases as yīnggāi, kěndìng, xiǎnrán and wúyí fare worse when 
they appear right after the standard-of-comparison phrase than when they appear right before bǐ. 
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function is to “add an epistemic flavor” (so to speak) to the strict comparative morpheme. The 
“epistemicized” comparative morpheme, in turn, contributes the epistemic reading of the whole 
sentence.  
In order for the analysis to work, two reasonable assumptions are in order. First, epistemic 
yào immediately precedes what it modifies. This assumption trivially follows from the 
generalization that by default, Mandarin Chinese modifiers appear immediately before what they 
modify (Li and Thompson 1981). Second, modification of the strict comparative morpheme by 
epistemic yào takes place at the surface position of the morpheme. Hence, if a strict comparative 
morpheme moves, epistemic yào only modifies it at the final position where it ends up. This 
assumption is also reasonable, given the fact that Mandarin Chinese modifiers, except for certain 
cases of modification mediated by the relative marker de (see Zhang 2015), cannot be stranded. 
Let us see how the above proposal regarding the function of epistemic yào can explain its 
distribution in comparative and other constructions. The first construction I discuss is the bǐ 
comparative, which is an explicit comparative construction that specifies a “>” relation. In this 
paper, I adopt Xiang’s (2005) DP-shell structure for this construction (a la Larson 1988), as 
represented in Figure 1 for the bǐ sentence in (41).  
 
(41) gēge  bǐ mèimei  gāo (sān límǐ). 
elder brother  BI  younger sister  tall  three centimeter 
‘The elder brother is (three centimeters) taller than the younger sister.’  
 
    S                                                                   S                                           
                                                              
      DP             DegP                                               DP            DegP 
      gēge                                                                    gēge 
                 Deg                AP                                              Deg              AP    
                  bǐ                                                          EXCEED  + gāo  
                               DP               A'                                                 DP             A' 
                            mèimèi                                                         mèimei 
                                           A              DegP                                                 A            DegP 
                              EXCEED + gāo                                                          gāo 
                                                    DP            Deg'                                                  DP        Deg' 
                                               mèimei                                                              mèimei 
                                                           Deg              DP                                             Deg            DP                       
                                                        EXCEED    (sān límǐ)                                EXCEED  (sān límǐ)            
 
     Figure 1: Structure of the bǐ comparative       Figure 2: Structure of the transitive comparative 
 
Under Xiang’s (2005) analysis, the bǐ comparative construction involves two degree (Deg) 
heads. The higher Deg head corresponds to the overt strict comparative morpheme bǐ. The lower 
Deg head is a phonologically null strict comparative morpheme which Xiang dubbed EXCEED 
and which combines with the gradable predicate (cf., Grano and Kennedy 2012)21. As a modifier, 
epistemic yào can appear before either – or even both – of the two Deg heads (cf., (34) and (35)). 
                                                            
21 Grano and Kennedy (2012) considered the possibility of EXCEED heading its own functional projection and then 
raising to affix on the gradable predicate (a la Xiang 2005) as well as the possibility of EXCEED affixing directly to 
the gradable predicate. My proposal is compatible with both possibilities.  
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Due to the “affinity” of the covert EXCEED degree morpheme to the gradable predicate and the 
adjacency of the gradable predicate to the standard-of-comparison phrase, appearing immediately 
before EXCEED amounts to appearing right after the standard-of-comparison phrase. When the 
extent marker de appears in a bǐ comparative sentence, the extent phrase introduces yet another 
comparative morpheme and hence opens up a third slot for epistemic yào (cf., (34) and (36)). 
Epistemic yào can also appear in the transitive comparative construction, its close kin guò 
and chū comparatives (cf., (13), (16) and (17)) as well as the gèng comparative (cf., (18)). But 
differently from the bǐ comparative, none of these four comparative constructions – when used on 
their own – allows for positional flexibility or multiple occurrences of epistemic yào. The reason, 
however, is very simple: these comparative constructions each contain one (and only one) strict 
comparative morpheme for epistemic yào to modify.  
For the transitive comparative construction, I adopt the syntactic representation as 
proposed by Xiang (2005) and Grano and Kennedy (2012), which is similar to that of the bǐ 
comparative. This is given in Figure 2 above for the sentence in (41). The covert comparative 
morpheme EXCEED, initially heading the lower Deg projection, raises to the higher Deg head. At 
that surface position, it combines with the gradable predicate, which also raises from the lower 
adjective phrase. Given the configuration in Figure 2 and the assumptions about modification by 
epistemic yào, it follows naturally that as a modifier of the strict comparative morpheme in a 
transitive comparative sentence, epistemic yào can appear immediately before the gradable 
predicate (along with the phonologically silent EXCEED morpheme), and in no other position. The 
guò and chū comparative constructions have been taken to be very similar to the transitive 
comparative, where guò and chū belong to the same class of EXCEED and affix to the gradable 
predicate (Grano and Kennedy 2012). Thus, if epistemic yào appears in a guò or chū comparative 
sentence, it must appear right before the gradable predicate. As for the gèng comparative 
construction, Liu (2010: p. 1593) convincingly argued that gèng is “a comparative morpheme 
denoting a greater-than relation”. Hence, when epistemic yào occurs in a gèng comparative 
sentence, it fills in the modifier position immediately before gèng.  
Now that I have shown those constructions compatible with epistemic yào all contain at 
least one overt or covert strict comparative morpheme, next I will show that all constructions 
incompatible with epistemic yào lack a strict comparative morpheme. The yǒu degree construction 
(cf., (21), repeated in (42)) has been shown by Xie (2014) to be an equative construction 
comparable to the as…as construction in English. According to Xie’s analysis, the structure of the 
yǒu degree construction involves a covert degree morpheme. However, this degree morpheme 
encodes a “≥” relation, and as such, it is not a strict comparative morpheme as defined in this paper. 
Then, it comes as nothing strange that the yǒu degree construction cannot license epistemic yào. 
 
(42) *Zhāngsān  de chéngjì yào  yǒu tā gēge   hǎo.  
 Zhangsan  MOD grade  should  have his elder brother good 
Intended: ‘Zhangsan’s academic performance should be as good as his elder brother’s’ 
(Without yào): ‘Zhangsan’s academic performance is as good as his elder brother’s’ 
 
The equative construction marked with hé/gēn/xiàng x yīyàng g (cf., (5), repeated in (43)) 
establishes a strict identity (rather than strict comparison) relation between the two entities under 
comparison (Eckardt 2009). Thus, it does not involve a strict comparative morpheme, either. As 
for implicit comparative sentences, such as those marked by gēn x bǐ qǐlái “compared with x” (cf., 
(15), repeated in (44) with minimum stylistic modifications), by definition they make use of “the 
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inherent context sensitivity of the positive (unmarked) form” of gradable predicates (Kennedy 
2007: p. 143). Their structures do not involve any comparative morphology to begin with, let alone 
morphology that expresses strict comparison. Similarly, it is a trivial fact that non-degree 
comparative constructions, on their own, do not involve any comparative morphemes (cf., (3), 
repeated in (45)), let alone strict comparative morphemes. This lack of strict comparative 
morphology sets implicit comparative constructions, equative constructions, and non-degree 
comparative constructions apart from explicit strict comparative constructions, and disallows them 
to license epistemic yào. 
 
(43) * Dàiyù yào gēn Bǎochāi  yíyàng  cōngmíng. 
   Daiyu YAO with Baochai same  smart 
   Intended: ‘Daiyu should be (exactly) as smart as Baochai.’ 
(44) *gēn    bālǐ dǎo bǐqǐlái,      xiàwēiyí yào hěn  guì 
  with    Bali island  compare   Hawaii YAO very   expensive  
Intended: ‘Compared with Bali island, Hawaii should be very expensive.’ 
(Without yào): ‘Compared with Bali island, Hawaii is very expensive.’ 
(45) *Bǎoyù míngtiān zǎoshàng yào zàijiā. 
  Baoyu tomorrow morning YAO at home 
  Intended: ‘It should be the case that Baoyu will be at home tomorrow morning.’ 
 
Given the above discussion, I think it is reasonable to claim that the presence of a strict 
comparative morpheme (whether overt or covert) in the structure of a comparative construction is 
the sole responsible factor for the acceptability of epistemic yào in that construction. Those 
constructions without a strict comparative morpheme disallow occurrence of epistemic yào, 
precisely because they lack such a morpheme. 
I would like to briefly point out that explicit strict comparison is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for licensing epistemic yào. Other constraints may rule out the epistemic 
reading of yào in an explicit strict comparative sentence. As already mentioned in Section 1, yào 
appearing in a dynamic sentence cannot be interpreted as an epistemic modal. This generalization 
applies to yào in dynamic sentences which at the same time specify explicit strict comparison. 
Take the Mandarin Chinese comparative correlative construction of the form “yuè Verb yuè 
Gradable predicate”, often paraphrasable through the English comparative conditional 
construction “the more … the more.” It involves explicit comparison of the same or different 
individuals’ degrees associated with a gradable property (J. Lin 2007). However, the construction 
does not allow yào in it to have an epistemic reading, as illustrated by the unacceptable sentence 
in (46) in which yào is epistemically intended.22 The unacceptability is attributable to the property 
that the yuè… yuè comparative correlative construction involves a dynamic change of state (J. Lin 
2007). The same explanation lies behind the observation that yào cannot have an epistemic reading 
in the degree achievement construction (47), which can be analyzed as involving a strict 
comparison morpheme but which expresses dynamic changes (Kennedy and Levin 2008).23  
   
                                                            
22 The sentence in (46) is acceptable under the dispositional reading about the child’s propensity of becoming more 
and more beautiful, given how the circumstances are in the relevant context.  This dynamic, dispositional reading is 
different from epistemic reading (Portner 2009: Chapter 4). 
23 When yào appears before jiākuān ‘widen, be widened’, the sentence is (47) is acceptable under the non-epistemic 
interpretation that the roads are scheduled or required to be widened.  
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(46) *nà     ge háizi yàoepistemic  yuè zhǎng   yuè      hǎokàn. 
  that   CL child should   YUE grow     YUE   good-looking 
       Intended: ‘It should be the case that the more the child grows, the prettier she becomes.’  
(47) shāngchǎng fùjìn de mǎlù (*yàoepistemic)   míngnián (*yàoepistemic) jiākuān 
department store near MOD road YAO  next year YAO             widen 
Intended: ‘The roads near the department store will widen/be widened next year.’ 
  
One may raise the questions of whether other modal uses of yào are also morpheme 
modifiers. My answer is negative. The primary empirical motivation for treating epistemic yào as 
a modifier is the positional flexibility and possibility of multiple occurrences in certain 
comparative sentences. Neither property is attested with non-epistemic uses of yào. Another 
related question to ask is what (morpho-)syntactic category epistemic yào belongs to. That is, is 
epistemic yào a modal verb (like English may and can), a modal adjective/adverb (like English 
possible and possibly), or something else. In its non-epistemic modal uses (cf., Sec. 2.3), yào is 
generally taken to be a modal verb (T. Lin 2012, Ren 2008, Peng 2007). Out of consideration of 
lexical parsimony, I would think that the epistemic use of yào is a modal verb, as well. However, 
the positional flexibility and potential multiple occurrence of epistemic yào calls this 
categorization into question, for typically Chinese modal verbs do not show similar properties. 
Epistemic yào is likely to undergo grammaticalization from a verb to an adverbial element. 
Whether this is indeed the case and if so, what motivates the grammaticalization are questions that 
I have to leave open to future research. 
 
3.2 Semantic interpretation of epistemic yào 
To define the formal semantics of epistemic yào, two matters call for immediate attention. 
The first one is how to represent the function of epistemic yào as a modifier that “epistemicizes” 
the modified strict comparative morpheme, rather than directly taking the whole “prejacent 
proposition” as its argument. The second one is how to encode the weak necessity quantificational 
force of epistemic yào, which is comparable to English should and ought to. The incompatibility 
of epistemic yào with negation will be attributed to the morpho-syntactic status of epistemic yào 
of being a morpheme modifier and its lexical competition with another phrase with (almost) 
identical semantics (Section 3.3). As such, it does not need to be addressed in its formal semantic 
definition of epistemic yào. 
 In this paper, I assume that strict comparative morphemes, when modified by epistemic 
yào, serve as immediate arguments to the latter. Though such morphemes have the essential 
semantic “core” of establishing a strict superiority or inferiority relation between two degrees – 
through comparing two degrees directly or comparing with the mediation of individuals, their 
semantic definitions are far from being uniform, having to take into consideration such factors as 
the varied semantic types of gradable predicate and the phrasal vs. clausal comparative distinction. 
In this paper, I abstract away from all this potential “complications,” by naively assuming that all 
strict comparative morphemes (abbreviated as “SC” in (48)) in Mandarin Chinese involve 
individual comparison and that their semantic “core” takes the general shape as in (48) (Heim 1985, 
Beck 2011). 24 Furthermore, we assume a gradable predicate P to have the semantics as in (49), of 
                                                            
24 This is a simplistic yet harmless assumption, so as to make the paper focused on its primary topic, viz., the epistemic 
use of yào. If the semantics of a certain strict comparative morpheme turns out to take a different form, the subsequent 
analysis in this paper can be adjusted accordingly. The semantics in (48) only outlines the “core” strict comparative 
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the type <d, <e,t>>, and the maximality operator used in (48) is defined as in (50). 25 Thus, the 
semantic “core” of strict comparative morphemes serves to establish a “>” relation between two 
individuals x’s and y’s respective maximum degrees of satisfying the predicate P. 
 
(48) [[ SC]]  = λxe λP<e,dt> λye. MAX(λd. P(d)(y)) > MAX(λd'.P(d')(x)) 
(49) [[ P]]  = λdd λxe. x satisfies the property associated with P to a degree d. 
(50) MAX(P) = ιd: P(d) ˄ ∀d' [ P(d')  d' ≤ d] 
 
 Regarding the weak necessity quantificational force of epistemic yào, Copley’s (2006) and 
von Fintel and Iatridou’s (2008) discussion of the English modals should and ought to provides a 
possible formal means of handling it. The basic intuition in their analysis of should and ought to 
is that the semantics of a weak necessity modal requires: (i) the prejacent proposition of the modal 
be true in every world that is accessible from the speaker’s perceived evidence/knowledge/belief 
status in a possible world and that is ranked as most highly plausible according to some ideal 26; 
and (ii) the prejacent proposition would be allowed (but crucially not required) to be false if the 
speaker found herself with a different knowledge/belief status or located in a world with a different 
set of evidence. The first requirement specifies that a weak necessity modal universally quantifies 
over a set of most relevant possible worlds – most relevant in the sense that the worlds are directly 
accessible from the world that the speaker is located at, viz., the speaker’s base world. The second 
requirement keys in the possibility of the prejacent proposition being false in a possible world that 
is compatible with a world alternative to the speaker’s base world. It is this secondary possibility 
– which exists only in a domain of quantification “stretched” beyond the speaker’s (base) world – 
that contributes the weaker necessity quantificational force perceived with such modals as should 
and ought to.  
Copley’s (2006) and von Fintel and Iatridou’s (2008) analytic insights can be adopted to 
capture the weak necessity quantificational force of epistemic yào. An important distinction which 
needs to be accommodated for, though, is that being a modifier, epistemic yào does not directly 
take the prejacent (i.e., de-modalized) proposition as its argument. Rather, its direct argument is 
the comparative relation expressed by the modified strict comparative morpheme (i.e., (48)). 
Factoring in this selectional difference and ignoring any possible temporal information – which is 
irrelevant to the current discussion – I define the semantics of epistemic yào as in (51), by 
following Kratzer’s (1981) theoretical framework of modality, just as in Copley’s and von Fintel 
and Iatridou’s works.  
 
(51)  [[ yàoepistemic]] = λwλSλxλPλy. ∀w'(w'∈HIGH-PLAUSIBLE(MBepistemic(w))  [S(x)(P)(y)]w' = 1) ˄ 
∃M(M∈ ALT(MBepistemic(w)) ˄ ∃w'' (w''∈ HIGH-PLAUSIBLE(M) ˄ [S(x)(P)(y)]w'' = 0)), where S 
is a morpheme that specifies a strict comparative relation. 27 
                                                            
relation. Individual strict comparison morphemes may have their own “add-ons” in semantic definition, as will be 
discussed for gèng shortly.       
25 The semantic definition of gradable predicates does not affect my proposal, either. For instance, with some trivial 
adjustments I can recast the analysis in the remainder of this section, by assuming the gradable predicate P to denote 
a measure function of the type <e, d>.  
26 In this paper, for the sake of simplicity I assume doxastic and epistemic modality to be one and the same thing. The 
interested reader can refer to such works as Roberts (2015) for insightful discussion of distinctions between doxastic 
and epistemic modalities.   
27 I assume that the set of alternatives used in this definition does not include the modal base accessible from the 
speaker’s base world. That is, I assume MBepistemic(w) ∉ ALT(MBepistemic(w)). 
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The distributive restriction of epistemic yào to the very small number of explicit strict 
comparative constructions is encoded as a presupposition on the “S” argument. That is, the 
restriction is specified in the lexical semantics of epistemic yào. The shorthand “MBepistemic” in the 
definition stands for the epistemic modal base, which is the set of worlds compatible with, or 
accessible from, the speaker’s perceived evidence/knowledge/belief status in a possible world, 
typically her base world. The HIGH-PLAUSIBLE function, which corresponds to Kratzer’s (1981) 
notion of ordering among possible worlds, picks the most plausible worlds from the set of 
accessible worlds based on some contextual ideal, and discards those worlds that are far-stretched. 
ALT(MBepistemic(w)) yields a set of modal bases alternative to the modal base accessible from the 
world w. Each alternative modal base involves a set of worlds that are compatible with the 
evidence/knowledge/belief status that the speaker has, or is associated with, in a world dislocated 
from her (base) world (cf., fn. 27). Mediated by a strict comparative morpheme serving as its direct 
argument, the semantics of epistemic yào, in effect, requires: (i) the associated strict comparative 
proposition be true in all of the highly plausible worlds accessible from the speaker’s perceived 
evidence/knowledge/belief status in her (base) world, and (ii) the proposition be false in a highly 
plausible world accessible from the speaker’s perceived evidence/knowledge/belief status 
(sufficiently) different from her perceived evidence/knowledge/belief status that she has, or is 
associated with, in her base world. 
With the above background, we have everything that we need to derive the semantics of 
epistemic yào sentences. Our example is the simple gèng sentence in (52). The degree morpheme 
bǐ and the proper name Lǐsì can be explicitly added after zhāngsān to introduce the standard of 
comparison. However, for the sake of simplicity, let us omit bǐ and Lǐsì, and assume that the 
standard of comparison is provided from prior linguistic contexts. 
 
(52) In discussing Zhangsan’s and Lisi’s heights, the speaker utters: 
zhāngsān yào gèng    gāo. 
Zhangsan YAO GENG    tall 
‘Zhangsan should be taller.’ 
 
I adopt the semantic definition of gèng as proposed by Liu (2010), which is the same as 
(48), except for the evaluative presupposition that specifies the properties predicated of the objects 
under comparison to be true in the absolute sense (i.e., their degrees exceeding the relevant 
contextual standard):  
 
(53) [[ gèng ]] = λxe λP<e,dt> λye. MAX(λd. P(d)(y)) > MAX(λd'.P(d')(x)), where the properties 
predicated of x and y are true in the absolute sense. 
 
Applying the semantics of gèng to that of epistemic yào in (51) would yield the results in 
(54). In the context given here and assuming w0 to be the speaker’s base world, the semantic 
interpretation of the whole sentence is represented in (55). In prose, the final representation says: 
(i) the speaker believes that both Zhangsan and Lisi are tall in the relevant context, (ii) the speaker 
believes that Zhangsan is (even) taller (than Lisi), and (iii) at the same time, the speaker leaves 
open the possibility of Zhangsan is not taller than Lisi, should she have access to a different set of 
perceived evidence/knowledge/belief status. Roughly speaking, this semantics amounts to saying 
that the speaker has a strong belief that Zhangsan is taller than Lisi, but she cannot rule out for sure 
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the possibility of Zhangsan being not taller than Lisi. This interpretation, I think, captures native 
intuition regarding what the sentence in (52) means. 
 
(54) [[ yàoepistemic]]  ( [[ gèng ]] ) = λwλxλPλy. ∀w'(w'∈HIGH-PLAUSIBLE(MBepistemic (w))  [MAX(λd. 
P(d)(y)) > MAX(λd'.P(d')(x))]w' = 1) ˄ ∃M(M∈ ALT(MBepistemic(w)) ˄ ∃w'' (w''∈ HIGH-
PLAUSIBLE(M)  ˄ [MAX(λd. P(d)(y)) > MAX(λd'.P(d')(x))]w'' = 0)), where the properties 
predicated of x and y are true in the absolute sense. 
(55) [[  (52) ]]  = ∀w'(w'∈HIGH-PLAUSIBLE(MBepistemic(w0))  [MAX(λd. height(d)(Zhangsan)) > 
MAX(λd'.height(d')(Lisi))]w' = 1) ˄ ∃M(M∈ ALT(MBepistemic(w0)) ˄ ∃w'' (w''∈ HIGH-
PLAUSIBLE(M)  ˄ [MAX(λd. height(d)(zhangsan)) > MAX(λd'.height(d')(Lisi))]w'' = 0)), 
where the properties predicated of Zhangsan and Lisi are true in the absolute sense. 
 
Before I conclude this sub-section, I would like to point out informally that multiple 
occurrences of epistemic yào modifying distinguished strict comparative morphemes in a sentence 
would cause no problem for the theoretical analysis outlined above. Given how compositional 
semantic computation works, the possible-world semantic contribution of one epistemic yào would 
eventually serve as an argument input to that of the other epistemic yào. Because the two instances 
of epistemic yào are anchored to the same speaker in the same utterance context and in the same 
world, and because they “epistemicize” the same “prejacent proposition,” it is reasonable to 
identify the highly-plausible possible worlds that are quantified over in the semantic contributions 
of the two epistemic yào’s. Then, the semantic contribution of one of the two yào’s is vacuous. 
That is, the two occurrences of epistemic yào amount to one single occurrence, in terms of their 
semantic import. The effect of them occurring in the same sentence is most likely one of emphasis. 
 
3.3 The lack of interaction between epistemic yào and negation  
In this sub-section, I address the remaining question of why negation is unacceptable (or 
only marginally acceptable, for some speakers of Mandarin Chinese) in epistemic yào sentences, 
no matter whether negation appears before or after yào. Two separate stories are behind this rather 
unique restriction. First, I claim that the modifier status of epistemic yào gives rise to the 
prohibition of the modal appearing above negation, which is marked by bù and méi (i.e., *yào bù 
and *yào méi, but see fn. 12). Recall my analysis that epistemic yào is a modifier for strict 
comparative morphemes. Generally speaking, in Mandarin Chinese a modifier immediately 
precedes what it modifies (Li and Thompson 1981). Such modification disallows an intervening 
scope-bearing element – the negative markers bù and méi included – between the modifier and the 
modified. This requirement explains why yào cannot be followed by bù or méi. As evidence in 
support of this explanation, epistemic yào can co-occur with another epistemic modal yīnggāi in 
an explicit strict comparative sentence, as in (56). When they co-occur, yīnggāi must appear before 
yào. Switching the order of the two epistemic modals would yield an ungrammatical sentence. 
This observation is illustrated by the acceptability contrast between (56) and (57): the only 
difference between them is in the relative order of epistemically intended yào and yīnggāi. The 
unacceptability of (57) is due to the intervening yīnggāi, which breaks up the modification relation 
between epistemically intended yào and the comparative morpheme bǐ.28 
                                                            
28 A likely alternative explanation of yīnggāi having to appear before co-occurring yào is to claim that they are 
epistemic modals of different nature. For instance, it is possible that yào is an objective epistemic modal and yīnggāi 
a subjective one, in the sense of Lyons (1977) and Papafragou (2006). Peng (2007) and Peng and Liu (2012) have 
posited that in Mandarin Chinese, a subjective (interpretation of an) epistemic modal always appears before an 
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(56) jīntiān  jiāoqū   de     kōngqì yīnggāi    yào  bǐ shìqū de hǎo. 
      today  suburb  MOD     air  should     should BI city MOD good 
      ‘The air in the suburb today should be better than in the city.’  
(57) * jīntiān    jiāoqū      de        kōngqì yào       yīnggāi  bǐ shìqū de hǎo. 
         today    suburb     MOD   air  should      should BI city MOD good 
         Intended: ‘The air in the suburb today should be better than in the city.’  
 
Regarding the ban of epistemic yào appearing below negation (i.e., *bú yào and *méi 
yào),29, 30 I hypothesize, rather tentatively, that the ban results from competition between lexical 
items with (almost) identical semantics. The semantic definition of epistemically intended *bú yào, 
for example, is given in (58). 
 
(58) [[ bú yàoepistemic]] = λwλSλxλPλy. ∃w'(w'∈HIGH-PLAUSIBLE(MBepistemic(w)) ˄ [S(x)(P)(y)]w' = 0) 
∨ ∀M(M∈ ALT(MBepistemic(w)) → ∀w'' (w''∈ HIGH-PLAUSIBLE(M)  → [S(x)(P)(y)]w'' = 1)), 
where S is a morpheme that specifies a strict comparative relation. 
 
Between the two conjuncts linked by the disjunctive operator “∨,” the second conjunct, in effect, 
stipulates that all modal bases alternative to the one accessible from the speaker’s (base) world can 
verify the prejacent proposition of the strict comparative sentence where the epistemically intended 
*bú yào appears. This requirement, however, cannot hold true in general, for it amounts to 
requiring that the modal base in the speaker’s (base) world rank the least ideal among all possible 
modal bases. Nothing a priori renders such an extreme under-privileged status for the modal base 
accessible from the speaker’s (base) world. Thus, the second conjunct is constantly false, and the 
semantics of epistemically intended *bú yào would be equivalent to the first conjunct.  
The semantic effect of the first conjunct – modulo the strict comparative relation 
requirement – is equivalent to the semantics of kěnéng bù ‘possibly not’. Due to the equivalence 
of semantic “core,” the epistemically intended *bú yào competes with kěnéng bù, despite the extra 
strict comparative relation requirement with epistemic yào. I hypothesize that the former loses to 
the latter, for the simple reason, and preference, of quantifier scope rigidity observed in Mandarin 
Chinese. In Mandarin Chinese there is a very strong tendency that quantifiers admit surface scope 
readings and disallow inverse scope readings (Huang 1982, Aoun and Li 1989, among others). The 
semantic interpretation of epistemically intended *bú yào has the scope of bù ‘not’ and yào ‘should’ 
reversed from the surface order. By contrast, the semantic interpretation of kěnéng bù is isomorphic 
with the surface order of kěnéng ‘possible, possibly’ and bù ‘not’. This scope order contrast makes 
kěnéng bù fare better with the general tendency of surface scope interpretation in Mandarin 
Chinese 31. Of course, whether my hypothesis is on the right track crucially depends on the 
                                                            
objective (interpretation of an) epistemic modal on the surface. If this is indeed the case, then it follows that epistemic 
yào has to follow epistemic yīnggāi when they co-occur. Unfortunately, at this point I cannot decide between the 
modification-based explanation discussed in the text and this alternative objectivity/subjectivity-based explanation.  
29 A side note: “bù yào” undergoes tone sandhi and changes to “bú yào.” 
30 The phrase bú yào is acceptable if it is used to mean “do not want/require” or “must not, forbid”, and so is méi yào 
if it is used to mean “did not want/require.” Under such readings, however, yào in bú yào and méi yào is not used as 
an epistemic modal. 
31 Some native speakers of Mandarin Chinese find epistemically intended bú yào marginally acceptable, rather than 
utterly ill-formed. I suspect that the marginal status of epistemically intended bú yào for such native speakers arises 




(in)validity of the assumption that the strict comparative relation requirement in the semantics of 
epistemic yào ranks lower than the strong language-specific dis-preference of inverse scope 
interpretation. Whether there is independent evidence to motivate this assumption remains an open 
question. Thus, at this point my hypothesis about the ungrammaticality of epistemically intended 
bú yào is more suggestive than conclusive. 
To summarize, in this section I provided theoretical analyses of the three major properties 
of epistemic yào. I argued that differently from many modal elements that take prejacent 
propositions as their direct semantic argument, epistemic yào is in fact a modifier for strict 
comparative morphemes. This rather peculiar status of epistemic yào accounts for its restricted 
distribution as well as its inability to scope over negation. The weak necessity quantificational 
force of epistemic yào is captured by making recourse to alternative modal bases. The inability of 
epistemic yào to scope under negation is due to the loss of epistemically intended *bú yào and 
*méi yào to another lexical item, viz., kěnéng bù,that has (almost) identical semantics. However, 
this last idea is a mere stipulation at this point. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
It is well-known that modals in natural language can come with all sorts of peculiarities, in 
terms of form, distribution, interpretation, and so on. In this paper, I provided empirical description 
and theoretical investigation of the under-studied epistemic use of yào in Mandarin Chinese. The 
descriptive component focuses on three major properties of epistemic yào. First, epistemic yào is 
restricted to explicit strict comparative constructions, and is disallowed to appear in many other 
degree constructions and non-degree constructions. Second, epistemic yào cannot form any scopal 
relation with negation. Third, epistemic yào has a quantificational force stronger than that of 
existential modals, yet weaker than that of strong necessity modals. In this respect, epistemic yào  
is comparable to English modals should and ought to.  
In the theoretical analysis component of this paper, I argued that epistemic yào differs from 
many other epistemic modal elements in that it does not take propositions as its direct argument. 
Rather, its function is to modify strict comparative morphemes. This modifier status accounts for 
not only epistemic yào’s restricted distribution to explicit strict comparative constructions, but its 
inability to appear above negation. The weak necessity quantificational force of epistemic yào is 
encoded in its semantics by making recourse to alternative modal bases, which I think may 
constitute an innovative means to capture weak necessity in general. Last but not least, the inability 
of epistemic yào to scope under negation arises from its competition with, and presumed loss to, a 
lexical item with (almost) identical semantics. My answer to this last question, however, is 
tentative, and further independent motivation is needed to (dis)confirm it.  
Overall, I think the description and analysis of epistemic yào in this paper bring to the 
forefront some hitherto unnoticed interesting properties of modal elements existing in natural 
language, and reveal important new intra- and inter-linguistic variations in the distribution and 
meaning of modal elements. With that being said, there are certain other aspects of epistemic yào 
that I mostly ignored in this paper. For instance, I did not provide a comparative study of epistemic 
and other modal uses of yào (cf., Section 2.3). The interested reader is referred to Wu and Kuo 
2010 and T. Lin (2012) for some discussion of non-epistemic readings of yào. In addition, 
epistemic yào can occur together with another epistemic modal yīnggāi ‘should’, a phenomenon 
that was briefly mentioned in Section 3.3. The co-occurrence manifests interesting properties, and 
addressing the phenomenon is likely to bear direct relevance to Papafragou’s (2006) and 




Hacquard’s (2011) question of whether there are specialized modals for a subjective or objective 
reading (cf., fn. 28). Despite this theoretical potential, however, I have to leave it for future research, 
due to space limit.  
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